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The Federal Government and the 
Promise of Brown 
BRIAN K. LANDSBERG 
University of the Pacific, Sacramento 
The U.S. Depmtment of justice has played an important role in the development 
and enforcement of school desegregation law, by participating in Brown and later 
cases. From the Truman administration to the present, the thrust of government pol-
icy has been to promote unity and vindicate the unmet promise of the equal protec-
tion clause. The ambiguity of the Supreme Court's decision in Brown has allowed 
considerable flexibility in defining and remedying discrimination. Whether Brown 
failed or succeeded depends on which possible meaning of Brown one accepts. The 
department now should protect the gains under Brown from retrogressive attacks 
and should oppose resegregation. 
Ten years ago, former U.S. Assistant Attorney General David L. Norman 
spoke at an observance of Brown's thirtieth anniversary. He asked "whether 
there is a growing subscription to an unwritten amendment to a familiar 
principle: 'The amount of affirmative action, such as busing, required to 
overcome the effects of past discrimination is inversely related to the 
length of time which has elapsed since Brown. ' "1 On this fortieth anniver-
sary of Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas, signs of wea riness and 
forgetfulness persist, but neither the federal government nor the courts 
have yet succumbed. It is appropriate to retell the reasons for the federal 
role in the Brown decision and its enforcement. The retelling should make 
evident the importance of renewed vigor in federal support for the 
promise of Brown. 
During the pre-Brown era the federal government participated in racial 
segregation in various ways, such as federal financial assistance for separate 
schools, segregated public housing, and segregated programs for farmers. 
However, President Truman recognized the harm that racial discrimina-
tion wreaked on the nation and bega n to take steps to combat it. He 
ordered the military to desegregate. He convened a conference on civil 
rights. He strengthened fede ral equal employment opportunity efforts. 
And he enlisted attorneys of the Department of Justice, who filed amicus 
briefs attacking racially restrictive covenants,2 segregated railroad dining 
cars/ and segregated public graduate education. 4 Th e story is well known 
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of their filing a n amicus brief in Brown v. Board of Education in December 
1952, when President Truman was a lame duck president.5 However, it is 
worth recalling what the federal government was seeking in Brown. 
The De partment of Justice's first brief in B-rown n oted that the federal 
government has a "special responsibility for assuring vindication of the 
fundame n tal c ivil rights guaranteed by the Constitution."6 The brief 
focused on official race discrimination, observing that it "inevitably tend[s] 
to undermine the foundations of a society dedicated to freedom, justice, 
and equali ty."7 Finally, the brief expressed concern that "the existence of 
discrimination against min ority groups in th e United States has an adverse 
e ffect upon our re lations with other countries."8 Thus, the main concern of 
the federal government was not with private rights, but with nation al unity, 
enforcin g constitutional norms, and th e public interest. President Tru-
man 's actio ns reflected understanding that th e racial caste system was 
sh redding the fabric of national life. 
We should recognize that these goals may not have been identical to the 
goals of others involved in th e li tigation. Some may have sought ed uca-
tional reform and understood that segregatio n was a fatal shortcoming of 
American education in 1954. Others may have simply wanted to equalize 
education al opportunities. The government's goals had to do with unity 
and vindication of the unmet promise of the equal protection clause. 
The United States in Brown argued that the plaintiffs could win without 
overruling Plessy v. Ferguson, but that if the Court reached the issue, Plessy 
should be overruled. Children do not enjoy equality when they "know that 
because of their color the law sets them apart from others, and requires 
them to attend separate schools specially established for members of their 
race."9 The government concluded that "the Fourteenth Amendment for-
bids the classification of students on the basis of race or color so as to deny 
one group educational advan tages and opportunities afforded to 
another." '0 As to relief, the brief recommended that the Court remand to 
the lower courts "with directions to devise and execute such program for 
relief as appears most like ly to achieve orderly and expeditio us transition 
to a non-segregated system."" Relief need not occur "for thwith." As justifi-
cation for this gradua l approach, the brief a rgued that "[a] reasona ble 
period of time will obviously be required to permit formulatio n of new pro-
visions of law governing th e administration of schools in areas affected by 
the Court's decision." '2 
Mter hearing initial arguments during its October 1952 term, the Court 
set the case down for reargument in order to seek the views of the parties 
as to questions pro pounded by the Court. It also requested a further brief 
from the Eisenhower ad ministration. That brief addressed the questions 
the Court had asked a n d took no position o n the outcome, but at oral 
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argument Assistant Attorney General Rankin said "it is the position of the 
Department of Justice that segregation in public schools cannot be main-
tained under the Fourteenth Amendment, and we adhere to the views 
expressed in the original brief of the Department in that regard."'' As to 
relief, the United States noted the success of New Jersey in desegregating 
its schools. It noted various issues of school administration that the state 
would have to address. It assumed that neighborhood schools would be 
permissible even if they were substantially of one race.•• It argued that 
relief should be entered "as expeditiously as the particular circumstances 
permit. "15 
After Brown I ruled for the plaintiffs, the government filed a brief in 
B-rown II. In arguing that "the vindication of the constitutional rights 
involved should be as prompt as feasible ," the Department of Justice 
pointed out that "the 'personal and present' right ... of a colored child 
not to be segregated while attending public school is one which, if not 
enforced while the child is of school age, loses its value."'6 The federal gov-
ernment argued that the "right of children not to be segregated because of 
race or color ... is a fundamental human right, supported by considera-
tions of morality as well as law," and that "racial segregation affects the 
hearts and minds of those who segregate as well as those who are segre-
gated, and it is also detrimental to the community and the nation."'7 
Thus, in the Brown litigation before the Supreme Court the federal gov-
ernment took a uniform position through two administrations, with vary-
ing levels of enthusiasm. This pattern persists to the present day. All presi-
dents since John F. Kennedy have supported the correctness of Brown, and 
positions taken by the Department of Justice in court have echoed that 
support. However, as is shown below, commitments to enforcement have 
fluctuated, as have positions as to the operational details, sometimes less-
ening the extent to which the promise of Brown would be kept. 
Although the executive branch had participated in Brown as amicus 
curiae, Congress had bestowed no enforcement authority on the attorney 
general. 18 The executive branch did take action to enforce the order to 
desegregate the Little Rock, Arkansas, schools in the face of defiance by 
Governor Faubus.'9 Responding to acts of private violence against school 
desegregation, Congress did make obstruction of federal court orders a 
crime in 1960.20 However, not until ten years after Brown did Congress 
authorize a strong federal enforcement role: "Congress decided that the 
time had come for a sweeping civil rights advance, including national legis-
lation to speed up desegregation of public schools and to put teeth into 
enforcement of desegregation. "21 From the outset the congressional autho-
rization was hedged. It authorized the attorney general to bring school 
desegregation suits, but only after receiving a meritorious complaint from 
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a parent who is unable to maintain appropriate proceedings for relief and 
only if the a ttorney general finds that "the institution of an action will 
materially further the orderly achievement of desegregation in public edu-
cation."22 Moreover, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 specified that it did not 
empower any court or official to "issue any order seeking to achieve a 
racial balance in any school by requiring the transportation of pupils or 
students from one school to another or one school district to another in 
order to achieve such racial balance."23 It also authorized the federal gov-
ernment to provide technical assistance for desegregation and banned dis-
crimination in federally assisted programs. The 1964 act thus signaled Con-
gress's desire to bring de jure segregation to an end, but to keep the federal 
government out of de facto segregation cases. 
In the years that followed, the Department of Justice and the Depart-
ment of Education (and its predecessor Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare [HEW]) did take vigorous steps on three fronts. First, they 
contributed to the development of the legal standards governing desegre-
gation. HEW promulgated guidelines for desegregation that laid the foun-
dation for judging desegregation plans in terms of their success in actually 
e liminating racial segregation . The Department of Justice participated as a 
party or amicus in every Supreme Court school desegregation case and 
many lower court cases. Second, the Departments of Justice and Health, 
Education, and Welfare developed a joint strategy combining administra-
tive enforcement of Title VI of the 1964 act with Justice Department litiga-
tion against large numbers of school systems. The Department of Justice 
developed the statewide suit as a device for quickly obtaining desegrega-
tion decrees of general applicability.24 The Education Section of the Justice 
Department grew to over thirty attorneys by the mid-1970s. Third, the 
Department of Education provided a substantial carrot to help school sys-
tems desegregate: federal financial assistance for desegregation. The Emer-
gency School Assistance Act, as Orfield has told us, "helped hundreds of 
districts in teacher training, human relations, and curriculum develop-
ment work needed to make the transition from segregated to desegregated 
schools more effective."25 
Although the federal government thus has done much to promote the 
promise of Brown, the path has wavered. The definition of that promise was 
advanced in the Department of Justice amicus curiae brief in Green v. County 
School Board.26 There the United States argued that "s<r<:alled 'freedom of 
choice' plans satisfy the State's obligation only if they are part of a compre-
hensive program which actually achieves desegregation."27 The government 
identified the continued existence of "all-Negro schools, attended by an 
overwhelming majority of the Negro childre n" as the mark of an ineffec-
tive desegregation plan. Quoting the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the 
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United States argued: "Against the background of educational segregation 
long maintained by law, the duty of school authorities is to accomplish 'the 
conversion of a de jure segregated dual system to a unitary, nonracial 
(nondiscriminatory) system-lock, stock, and barrel.' "28 Further, "the 
Fourteenth Amendment bars State action which unnecessarily creates 
opportunities for the play of private prejudice."29 
The issue then arose whether the Court's approach in Green to desegre-
gation of a rural county would apply as well to a densely populated urban 
school system in which residential segregation prevailed. In Swann v. Char-
lotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, the brief of the United States struck a 
cautious note. !<) The brief did embrace Green, saying: 
We think the right of school children articulated in Brown is to attend 
school in a system where the school board exercises its decision-mak-
ing powers so as to operate a non-racial unitary school system free 
from discrimination, and that where this has not been done there is a 
violation of the rights of such children requiring remedial adjustments 
which give proper weight to that which is feasible and that which is 
just. If choices exist which may have a racial impact, they cannot be 
exercised in a racially neutral manner where to do so is to perpetuate 
segregation.51 
Thus, the courts should "require that the governmental decisions affecting 
racial segregation be so made and implemented, when feasible alternatives 
are available, as to disestablish the dual system and eliminate its vestiges."'2 
However, echoing Congress's ambivalence on the matter, the United States 
also concluded that "the Fourteenth Amendment does not require ... 
racial balance in all public schools or integration of every all-white or all-
Negro school."'' Thus, contrary to the prior norm, the government's posi-
tion in a school desegregation case diverged substantially but not wholly 
from that of the black plaintiffs." 
In the years that followed Swann the government has continued its 
homage to Brown, while sometimes urging the Court to limit Brown's 
applicability. Thus, on the one hand the government took the position that 
metropolitanwide remedies could be ordered only where a metropolitan 
violation has been found. ' 5 On the other hand the government argued that 
systemwide busing was appropriate in Columbus, Ohio, because the record 
reflected a systemwide violation. The government argued that a unitary 
school system is entitled to be released from a desegregation decree, while 
agreeing that eliminating the vestiges of discrimination is a prerequisite to 
a unitariness finding. 36 To some extent the fluctuations in the govern-
ment's position have been due to political changes from one administra-
tion to the next. Thus, at the Brown Plus Thirty conference, the assistant 
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attorney general for civil rights stressed cessation of busing and dissolution 
of desegregation decrees as central themes of the government's program 
for enforcing Brown.~7 This represents a change from the position of the 
Carter administration and one may expect the Clinton administration to 
reject these themes as well. 
Two other changes diminished the role of the federal government in 
enforcing Brown in the 1980s and continue to affect the federal role today. 
First, the resources devoted to enforcement have been curtailed. Today, 
the Civil Rights Division's section responsible for enforcing Brown employs 
only thirteen attorneys. That shrunken crew is responsible not only for 
hundreds of continuing court decrees requiring desegregation of e lemen-
tary and secondary education, but for higher education and sex and dis-
abili ty discrimination as well . Similarly, in the Department of Education 
today only 16 percent of the civil rights budget is spent on race discrimina-
tion issues.~ Second, the Emergency School Assistance Act program was 
essentially dismantled and its funds were diverted to general grants, which 
need not be used for desegregation or heavi ly minority school districts. 39 
In considering the future role of the federal government, one may 
appropriately begin by asking what the successes and failures of Brown have 
been. What has Brown accomplished? The structure of official racial segre-
gation in schools has been dismantled, though vestiges remain. States that 
once required segregation now have the most desegregated sch ools in the 
nation. Brown served as impetus for integration of public faci lities and pub-
lic accommodations and for nondiscrimination laws governin g voting, 
housing, and employment. The official racial caste system is dead. Brown is 
firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence and our national life and its repu-
diation would be virtually incon ceivable. There is massive consensus, on a 
very general level, that racial discrimination and segregation are wrong 
and that government should take steps to eradicate them. Thus, as Ken-
neth Clark has observed, Brown contributed "a simple, direct and eloquent 
statement of a moral truth. "40 
Set against these impressive gains is not so much failure as a shortfall in 
terms of racial justice. Thus, some of the gains under Brown are in danger 
of erosion. Th e statistics already reflect a modest erosion, and the Supreme 
Court's decision in Freeman v. Pitts" could lead additional school districts to 
seek release from their desegregation obligations.<2 Moreover, Brown has 
not brought to our children or society all the hoped-for benefits. "The gen-
erative power of Brown ... in the realm of equal educational opportunity, 
has been limited primarily to its ban on racial segregation. Even there, the 
refusal in Keyes to extend the ban to de facto segregation and the refusal in 
Milliken to extend it to interdistrict racial imbalance further confined 
Brown's reach."43 We now know that law is an imperfect tool of educational 
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reform. Yet early resistance to Brown meant that too great an emphasis had 
to be placed on litigation and too little on educational issues. This has led 
to another type of criticism, which I believe is misplaced: "Brown's failure 
.. . lay in its acceptance of a monolithic, color-blind society premised on 
the continued supremacy of white cultural norms, without regard to the 
role to be played by Mrican-American cultural norms. "« The fact is that 
while Brown referred at one point to education 's role "in awakening the 
child to cultural values," neither the parties nor the Court had occasion to 
address the issue of cultural norms. Nothing in Brown forecloses a claim of 
discriminatory imposition of white cultural n orms. Finally, one's analysis 
of whether Brown failed or succeeded depends on which possible meaning 
of Brown one accepts. "If equal opportunity means the end of racial isola-
tion and the achievement of equal funding or outputs, the Court long ago 
gave a negative answer. ... If equal opportunity m eans freedom from 
present intentional racial discrimination in the public schools, its future is 
secure. If it also means freedom from the lingering effects of past discrim-
ination , its future hangs in the balance. "•• 
What must be done for the future? We know from the myth of a vengeful 
and destructive Recon struction that factual distortion can undermine 
responsible efforts to achieve racial justice. 46 A new myth has arisen, that 
busing is a failed and destructive remedy. As Orfield demonstrates in his 
remarks in this issue, this too is a false and destructive myth. It is impera-
tive that we not allow the constant drumbeat of the failure of school deseg-
regation to go unanswered. The federal interest in the unity of the country 
suggests that we should stress the benefits of desegregation for all races 
and for our society as a whole. A vigorous effort to retain the gains under 
Brown must be mounted both in local communities and in the courts. The 
federal government, especially the Departments of Justice and Education, 
should join in that effort. They should renew the ca rrot-and-stick 
approach: federal money to encourage voluntary desegregation and assis-
tance to racially im pacted sch ool systems combined with more enforce-
ment resources targeted on racial discrimination in elementary and sec-
ondary education. The cases leave open the question of whether a former 
dual system that has become unitary has further obligations with respect to 
neutralized but not eradicated effects of past discrimination. Stated in non-
legalistic terms, may such a system adopt assignment techniques that cause 
resegregation? The civil rights bar should continue to litigate that issue. 
The Department of Justice should oppose resegregation. At the same time 
it should stress flexibility and restraint as to desegregation techniques. Liti-
gants should recognize, as we ll , that a remedy forged in the political 
process is more like ly to succeed. We should not allow past difficulties to 
entice us to renewed separatism. We must look to other measures to help 
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with the goal of achieving racial justice and not rely solely on the equal 
protection clause and nondiscrimination laws. Efforts to achieve economic 
equity, fair housing, and educational excellence in all schools are essential 
components in the quest for equal educational opportunity. Finally, we 
must emphasize Brown's "big tent" affirmation of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence and the Fourteenth Amendment and thereby maintain the pub-
lic and legal support for the core values of Brown.41 We should experiment 
within the confines of those core values and abjure solutions outside those 
confines. We should remember that compliance with Brown is a necessary 
condition for equal education, but it is not alone a sufficient condition to 
ensure equality. 
After forty years, the regime of Brown has not brought about equal edu-
cational opportunity. Many one-race schools remain. Even where schools 
are integrated, inequalities remain. School finances are unequal. Gradua-
tion rates are unequal. Othe r inequalities persist. Do these facts indict 
Brown? Or do they signify that the magnitude of the task is greater than we 
thought in 1954? Should we give up on Brown's promise? The question 
calls to mind that several milJennia have passed since we received the Ten 
Commandments. "Thou shalt not kill" remains a worthy aspiration. I 
believe the aspirations of Brown are similarly correct, an d that our task is to 
rededicate our efforts-which have flagged in recent years-to achieve 
equal educational opportunity. The federa l government's role in those 
efforts is as important as ever and should also be rededicated. 
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